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willingness to arbitrarily implement changes to the tax and regulatory structure in the future.
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 As world leaders seek out solutions for the mounting economic problems 
which seem to insurmountably beset their fragile economies, it seems only natural 
to inquire as to the causes of this prolonged economic malaise.  One of the most 
common explanations identifies low government expenditures as the culprit, but 
after three successive years in which the United States federal government budget 
has accounted for 40% or more of GDP, at the cost of rapidly escalating levels of 
federal debt, the likelihood of this hypothesis has been cast into doubt.  Another 
school of thought, pioneered by Robert Higgs to explain the duration of the Great 
Depression, places the onus of responsibility upon the arbitrary actions of policy 
makers that instilled a “pervasive uncertainty among investors about the security 
of their property rights in their capital and its prospective returns.”1  This paper 
will proceed along similar lines to analyze a broader spectrum of U.S. economic 
history, assessing why systemic uncertainty is evident in certain economic periods 
and which environmental conditions tend to create it. 
Theoretical Foundations of Systemic Uncertainty 
The analysis of systemic uncertainty arising from environmental factors 
within the political structure has become a popular topic since North and Thomas2 
posited their transaction-cost theory of economic history to explain the rise of the 
western world.  According to those authors, economic growth is made possible 
through the “development of an efficient economic organization … [which] 
entails the establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights that 
create an incentive to channel individual economic effort into activities that bring 
the private rate of return close to the social rate of return.”3  Since then, a large 
body of theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to explaining and 
quantifying the relationship between certain environmental conditions created by 
government and the level of economic growth, with the basic propositions 
advanced by North and Thomas receiving a great deal of support.4 
 In a way, North and Thomas’s work anticipated Higgs’ regime uncertainty 
principle, identifying the primary theoretical links between the political structure 
and economic growth as uncertainty and rent-seeking behavior.  This paper will 
                                                 
1
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focus on the first of those theoretical links, but the second is deserving of 
tangential acknowledgement, as it is a by-product of the activities of government 
that Higgs identifies as causing uncertainty.5  When government’s commitment to 
private property declines, it is natural for individuals to advance and/or protect 
their interests by rent-seeking behavior, lobbying government officials and 
engaging the public policy process, activities which Henisz describes as, “at best, 
zero sum.”6 Hence rent-seeking behavior may be viewed as a response to, or 
symptom of, systemic uncertainty, as individuals attempt to mitigate the level of 
uncertainty by influencing policy makers, and is sometimes used as a part of 
quantitative models of uncertainty.   
 Thus the primary causal nexus is the uncertainty principle which Higgs so 
aptly captured.  Fundamentally, the problems of uncertainty are related to 
government expropriation of private property, or the threat of such expropriation, 
or of arbitrary tax or regulatory regime changes, all of which discourage market 
participants from engaging in normal profit-seeking behavior.  This form of 
uncertainty is not simply caused by the government’s lack of commitment to 
private property rights, but by the inability of market participants to ascertain 
what type of regime will exist in the future.  As Stasavage writes, “If a firm fears 
that a government will have an incentive to make ex post changes in taxes or 
regulations, it may prefer to delay or cancel a proposed project.”7 
 When the character of a nation’s governance undermines the trust of 
investors, the trust which makes them sure of their possessions, there are a 
number of adverse impacts.  First of all, it stifles private investment, for when 
firms and individuals react to uncertainty, it fundamentally alters their willingness 
to risk assets in the present.  Thus any theory of private investment that neglects 
to include political environmental factors will not be able to fully explain the 
behavior of investors.8  Similarly, economic growth can’t simply be understood as 
the inevitable progress of market economies, but rather as the direct result of the 
development of institutional structures that support social and commercial profit-
maximizing relationships by protecting private property and establishing a system 
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to enforce contracts and resolve disputes.9  Without such a commitment to 
property rights and the rule of law, private investment will be repressed, to the 
detriment of the national economy as a whole.10  Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek 
(2009) find that increases in uncertainty lead to an increase in the cost of capital, 
through an increase in bond premia, which negatively impacts private 
investment.11 Similarly, Arellano, et al, show that increases in uncertainty lead to 
downsizing of investment projects to avoid default.12 
 The wariness of investors to risk their capital under conditions of political 
uncertainty not only negatively impacts the magnitude of private investment, but 
also has a severe distortionary impact on the rates investors demand, the 
instruments they use, and the time-frames for which they are willing to part with 
their funds.  When faced with systemic uncertainty, investors demand higher 
rates, especially for long-term capital outlays, and use financial instruments to 
mitigate their downside risk.  This can be clearly seen in the yield curve for 
corporate bonds, which develop wide gaps between the nominal returns to 
different maturities.13  Thus resources are allocated away from the long-term 
investment opportunities that are necessary for the growth of the capital stock.  
This inter-temporal distortion is only compounded in economies that rely on 
entrepreneurial individuals to drive economic growth.14 
 Resources may also be diverted towards derivative instruments that are 
designed to mitigate uncertainty.  When investors are faced with uncertainty, they 
can control their downside risk by exercising a “wait-and-see” strategy,15 using 
options as a hedge.  The prices of options are subject to the supply of, and demand 
for, these instruments, thus theoretically, a sudden increase in the uncertainty felt 
by investors could be observed in an increased demand for, and a subsequent 
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increase in the price of, derivative instruments.  Dreschler writes, “the prices of 
index options are sensitive to investors' level of uncertainty,” indeed, “options 
provide a hedge to variation in the level of uncertainty itself.”16 When the 
increased demand for derivative instruments is artificially inflated by government 
intervention, at least a portion of the resources directed to that purpose are no 
longer profit-maximizing and can be observed in the general price trend of these 
instruments.  
 Furthermore, the lack of political constraint on government officials 
complicates the entrepreneurial forecasting that is essential for the successful 
creation of new production structures and consumer goods.  While the majority of 
the literature on this topic focuses on the impacts systemic uncertainty has on 
investors, the analysis can be easily extended to entrepreneurs.  The causal-realist 
school has developed a rich understanding of the entrepreneur through the works 
of Mises17, Rothbard18, et al.  In summarizing this body of literature on the 
entrepreneurial role, Peter Klein19 writes, “The entrepreneurial function has been 
characterized in various ways: judgment (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Casson, 
1982; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2005), innovation (Schumpeter, 
1911), adaptation (Schultz, 1975, 1982), alertness (Kirzner, 1973), and 
coordination (Witt 1998).”20  A discussion of these various definitions is beyond 
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437–48; Israel Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity and Profit: Studies in the Theory of 
Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Ulrich Witt, “Imagination and 
Leadership: the Neglected Dimension of an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm,” Journal of 
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the scope of this paper,21 but suffice it to say that the theme that runs throughout 
is the intimate connection between entrepreneurs and uncertainty. 
 Entrepreneurial success is determined by the ability of the entrepreneur to 
predict future market conditions and find a combination of productive factors that 
can best satisfy those conditions.  As Mises writes, “The ultimate source from 
which entrepreneurial profit and loss are derived is the uncertainty of the future 
constellation of demand and supply,”22 echoing Cantillon, who wrote that, 
“Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages.”23  Knight (1964) used this conception 
of model uncertainty to link entrepreneurial judgment to profit and loss (1964, 
271).24  Thus arbitrary government policies increase the model uncertainty facing 
entrepreneurs and hamper their ability to engage in economic calculation and 
ascertain profitable opportunities. 
 Thus the adverse impacts of government induced uncertainty include both 
the dead weight loss of resources allocated to non-profit-maximizing activities 
and the opportunity cost of new products and inventions stifled by the high degree 
of uncertainty facing entrepreneurs.  Using this theoretical foundation, economists 
have used a wide array of formal models to simulate the relationship between 
politically generated systemic uncertainty and economic behavior.  The most 
common practice is to create an index or proxy for political constraints and/or 
economic freedom that captures the commitment of the political structure to 
property rights and the degree of institutional restraints.25  Such models have 
found political constraints to have a highly significant effect on GDP,26 lagged 
GDP growth,27 productivity,28 and private investment.29  However, as noted by 
Henisz (2000), many of these indexes lack a theoretical connection to the 
                                                 
21
 See Klein, “Discovery, Action, and Organization,” (2008). 
22
 Mises, Human Action (1998), 291. 
23
 Richard Cantillon, Essai sur (1755), 54. 
24
 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (New York: August M. Kelly, Bookseller, 1964), 
271. 
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 Henisz, “Institutional Environment,” (2000), 4-5. 
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 See Rudiger Dornbusch, “Policies to Move from Stabilization to Growth,” Proceedings of the 
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World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (1991): 19-48; Kevin Murphy, 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1991): 503-530; Dani Rodrik, “The Positive Economics of 
Policy Reform,” American Economic Review 83 (1993): 356-361. 
27
 See Robert Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106 (1991): 407-43; Henisz, “Institutional Environment,” (2000). 
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 See Klein and Luu, “Politics and Productivity,” (2003). 
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forthcoming (2010). 
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commitment to private property that rests at the heart of the systemic uncertainty 
problem (2000, 5).   
Economic Recessions and Evidence of Systemic Uncertainty 
 Into the muddied waters of this empirical literature, Higgs (1997) used 
polling data and evidence from financial markets to analyze what he coined, 
“regime uncertainty.”  This paper will expand on that analysis, applying similar 
logic and augmented evidence to several periods of economic malaise since the 
Great Depression, looking for the sources of observed systemic recession.  The 
first task is thus to determine the periods for analysis.  The National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee (2010) provides 
us with an excellent starting place.  According to the NBER, there have been ten 
periods of economic recession since the Great Depression, where they define a 
recession as a substantial drop in economic activity for a prolonged duration and 
across a widespread area, visible in the fluctuations of real GDP, real income, 
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.  The NBER table 
can be seen below.  For the purpose of comparison, I’ve chosen two time periods 
for analysis: March 2001 - Nov. 2001 and Dec. 2007 - June 2009.  The rationale 
behind this choice is that the character of government leadership over those 
periods varied from President Bush to President Obama, and thus gives us the best 
glimpse at how the character of government and the commitment to property 
rights impacts systemic uncertainty. 
Peak Trough Contract-
ion 
Expansion Cycle 
Quarterly dates 
are in parentheses 
Peak  
to  
Trough 
Previous 
trough  
to  
this peak 
Trough 
from  
Previous  
Trough 
Peak 
from  
Previous  
Peak 
July 1953(II) 
August 1957(III) 
April 1960(II) 
December 1969(IV) 
November 1973(IV) 
January 1980(I) 
July 1981(III) 
July 1990(III) 
March 2001(I) 
December 2007 (IV) 
May 1954 (II) 
April 1958 (II) 
February 1961 (I) 
November 1970 (IV) 
March 1975 (I) 
July 1980 (III) 
November 1982 (IV) 
March 1991(I) 
November 2001 (IV) 
June 2009 (II) 
10 
8 
10 
11 
16 
6 
16 
8 
8 
18 
45 
39 
24 
106 
36 
58 
12 
92 
120 
73 
55 
47 
34 
117 
52 
64 
28 
100 
128 
91 
56 
49 
32 
116 
47 
74 
18 
108 
128 
81 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. “U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions,” NBER.org, < http://www.nber.org/cycles.html> Accessed Dec. 2, 2011. 
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Departing from the proper chronological order, we begin with an analysis 
of the polling data surrounding the most recent financial collapse, aided by the 
relative recentness of the polling data available and the multitude of different 
indexes provided by business research groups.  Looking at the polling results, the 
intense ideological debate which characterized the 2008 election provides the 
most striking example of systemic uncertainty since Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Early 
evidence of this can be found in a September 2008 poll conducted by Chief 
Executive Magazine,30 which found that an astounding 74% percent of CEOs 
polled “feared” an Obama presidency.  That poll found that then-candidate 
Obama’s tax policies scored the lowest in overall approval, though his stances on 
regulatory policy scored a close second. As president, Obama has not faired any 
better.  A 2010 Bloomberg survey of 873 of its subscribers, conducted by Selzer 
& Co., found that 77% of the business and financial leaders surveyed believed 
Obama to be too anti-business.  One respondent, David Young, a managing 
director for a broker dealer in New York, said, “Investors no longer feel they can 
trust their instincts to take risks.”31  Participants in that poll cited Obama’s efforts 
to trim bonuses and earnings, make health care his top priority over jobs, and 
plans to tax rich ”fat cats,” as primary sources of their uneasiness.32 
 The lack of confidence in President Obama’s policies has coincided with a 
period of economic turmoil, the combined effect of which can clearly be seen in 
the polling numbers.  The Business Roundtable and the Chief Executive Magazine 
each conduct regular surveys of business executives, which, though lacking in 
specificity, can be used to gauge the general sentiments of these industry leaders.  
Graph 133 plots the poll numbers of these indexes from 2003 - 2011, with various 
important dates marked.  As Graph 1 indicates, business leaders were well ahead 
of the general population in foreseeing the coming economic collapse, at least in 
the Chief Executive Magazine CEO Index, and their confidence has not yet 
returned to a pre-recession level. 
The problem with using these CEO Confidence Indices is that they 
incorporate the sentiments of business leaders on a wide array of issues; the 
economy as a whole, market demand, etc.  Thus, for our purposes, more in depth 
information is necessary to identify with any degree of certainty what events led 
                                                 
30
 Chief Executive, “Job Creators Prefer John McCain 4-to-1 Over Barack Obama,” 
ChiefExecutive.net, October 8, 2008, accessed December 9, 2011, http://chiefexecutive.net/job-
creators-prefer-john-mccain-4-to-1-over-barack-obama. 
31
 Heidi Przybyla, “Obama Seen as Anti-Business by 77% of U.S. Investors,” Bloomberg.com, 
Jan. 21, 2010, accessed Dec. 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8UiI1bCRdmY. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 See Appendix 1: Graphs for Graph 1 - 10. 
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to this prolonged lack of confidence. Higgs34 lists the multitude of legislative 
enactments that characterized the New Deal to support his case, and while a 
similar list for the current time period is far shorter, it’s most notable members, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), are each 
thousands of pages long with far-ranging economic impacts.  Perhaps most 
importantly, however, each bill delegates unprecedented rulemaking authority to 
the federal bureaucracy, creating an estimated 159 new agencies, boards, 
commissions, and other entities.35  As Gary Lawson writes about the healthcare 
reform act, “As is true of most modern legislation of any consequence, the 
PPACA is not so much a set of norms to regulate conduct as an authorization to 
administrators to produce norms to regulate conduct.”36  According to the Federal 
Register’s website, Dodd-Frank has been the subject of 590 rules and notices, an 
unprecedented total only dwarfed by the PPACA, which has generated an 
astounding 1,313 rules and notices, about a third of which are still in the proposal 
and comment stage.37 
As was discussed earlier, the inability on the part of entrepreneurs to 
ascertain future market conditions because of arbitrary government intervention is 
one of the primary causes of uncertainty.  And the survey responses of business 
leaders indicate that the PPACA and Dodd-Frank are creating this sort of 
uncertain business environment.  Shortly after the 2010 midterm elections, the 
Midwest Business Group on Health conducted a survey of business leaders and 
found that 60% of their sample believed that the intent of the PPACA was to 
eliminate the current employer-based system of health care delivery and move to 
a single-payer system.  64% of all respondents indicated that they expected the 
PPACA to increase the cost of doing business, including 80% of employers from 
companies with greater than 500 employees.38  Larry Boress, MGBH President 
and CEO said, “There remains a great deal of uncertainty among employers about 
                                                 
34
 Higgs, “Regime Uncetainty,” (1997). 
35
 Grace-Marie Turner, et al, Why ObamaCare is Wrong for America (New York: HarperCollins, 
2011). 
36
 Gary Lawson, “Reviving Formal Rulemaking: Openness and Accountability for Obamacare,” 
Heritage Backgrounder no. 2585, July 25, 2011 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2585.pdf. 
37
 Federal Register.gov, Accessed 12/5/2010 http://www.federalregister.gov. 
38
 Midwest Business Health Group, “Key Findings of Employer Reaction to Health Reform-Post 
Election Survey,” Dec. 22, 2010, 
https://www.mbgh.org/templates/UserFiles/Files/Key%20Findings%20of%20Dec%202010%20S
urvey%20of%20Employers%20Reacton%20to%20Health%20Reform(2).pdf. 
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how health reform will ultimately impact their efforts to provide health benefits 
for their employees.”39   
Additionally, business leaders remain skeptical that the lofty goals of the 
PPACA will be achieved.  86% of those surveyed by the MBGH responded that 
it’s unlikely the PPACA will reduce the rate at which health care costs are 
increasing, with 74% responding that the bill will actually increase costs faster 
than if it hadn’t been passed.40  A McKinsey & Company poll of 1,329 private 
sector employers found that 36.6% of respondents currently offering employer-
sponsored health plans would probably or definitely drop those plans after 2014 
due to cost escalation.  And the more a respondent understood about the PPACA, 
the more likely they were to drop their current plans, with 68.3% of respondents 
evidencing “high” awareness of the bill’s content responding that they’d either 
probably or definitely end employer-sponsored insurance.41  A similar poll of 
small business owners conducted by Discover Small Business Watch found that 
47% of small business owners were considering ending their employee health 
coverage due to rising costs, and that 55% of small business owners favor 
repealing the PPACA altogether.42 
When it comes to Dodd-Frank, there is dissension among industry 
professionals about how the law’s different provisions will impact their financial 
strategies.  The opinions of banking professionals and fund managers carry 
additional weight since their sentiments are directly tied to the amount of capital 
they are willing to invest on behalf of their clients, which forms a large share of 
the nation’s private investment. A poll conducted by Ernst & Young of brokerage 
firm compliance officers found that high percentages of respondents believed that 
the changes made by Dodd-Frank and the subsequent Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regulations authorized by that legislation, will 
have a “high impact” on their compliance costs.43  71.5% of the participants in 
that survey responded that the FINRA suitability requirements would have a high 
                                                 
39
 Larry Boress, qtd. in Jenny Ivy, “Reform takes aim at benefits, employers say,” 
benefitspro.com, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.benefitspro.com/2011/01/03/reform-takes-aim-at-
benefits-employers-say. 
40
 MBHG, “Key Findings,” 3. 
41
 McKinsey & Co., “Employer Survey on US Health car e Reform: Details regarding the survey 
methodology,” mckinsey.com, June 2011, 
www.mckinsey.com/Features/US_employer_healthcare_survey. 
42
 Discover Small Business Watch, “Discover Survey Finds Majority of Small Business Owners 
Favor Repeal of Health-Care Reform Law,” InsuranceTechnology, Jan. 18, 2011, http://insurance-
technology.tmcnet.com/news/2011/01/18/5251891.htm. 
43
 Ernst & Young, “Compliance perspectives on new regulations 2011,” www.ey.com, 2011 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Compliance_Perspectives_on_New_Regulation_201
1_FINAL/$FILE/Compliance_Perspectives_on_New_Regulation_2011_FINAL.pdf, 4. 
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impact on their compliance costs.  A similar study conducted by Grant Thornton 
LLP, found that 91% of the bank CEOs, CFOs and audit committee members 
surveyed identified the burden of regulatory reform on their bank as the primary 
concern for their institution over the next 12 months.44  In that study, 48% of 
respondents indicated that they believe Dodd-Frank will not be effective at all in 
detecting systemic risks to the financial industry.45  A similar question posed to 
the attendees at Hedge Fund Association’s Risk and Regulation Symposium 
found that 93% of the fund managers surveyed at the event, a somewhat biased 
sample due to the self-selected nature of the group, responded that Dodd-Frank 
would not prevent another market crash.46 
The common sentiment among financial and banking industry 
professionals thus appears to be a combination of doubt over Dodd-Frank’s 
effectiveness and dismay over what they perceive to be a dramatic increase in 
their compliance costs.   The additional oversight of derivative instruments and 
the elimination of proprietary trading have created a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding future profits.  A survey of derivatives traders conducted by the TABB 
Group found that almost 90% of those surveyed believe that the Dodd-Frank will 
have a negative effect on their ability to make a profit, while about two thirds of 
the sample thought the act would erect steep barriers to entry in the market.47 
An interesting result of the polling on Dodd-Frank is that investors appear 
more pessimistic about the actual content of the law, and subsequent regulation.  
Compared to the PPACA, Dodd-Frank’s language has been more definitely laid 
out and the negative reaction on the part of industry professionals seems to be 
primarily opposition to that language and the way in which it will negatively 
impact their business models. 
Augmenting the polling evidence provided above, an examination of the 
financial data during the time period from 2007 - 2011 shows that private 
investment did/has not recovered to anywhere close to its pre-recession level.  In 
the second quarter of 2006, real gross private investment was at $2,263.1 billion 
and one year later it stood at $2,193.0 billion.  Then the financial crisis hit and 
                                                 
44
 Nichole Jordan, “Bank Executive Survey: Bankers’ optimism rebounds amid concerns over 
Dodd-Frank,” www.grantthornton.com, June 2011, accessed Dec. 8, 2011, 
http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Financial%20services/FSandFI%20files/Bank%
20Survey/Grant%20Thornton%20LLP-Bank%20Director-
18th%20Annual%20Bank%20Executive%20Survey.pdf, 2. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Jing Chen, “Fund Managers Not Dodd-Frank Fans,” www.hedgefund.net, Sept. 27, 2011, 
accessed Dec. 7, 2011, http://hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.aspx?story=12914. 
47
 Kevin McPartland, “Credit and Rate Swap Dealers 2011: Redefined and Reborn,” Tabb 
Group.com, Oct. 12, 2011 http://www.tabbgroup.com/PublicationDetail.aspx?PublicationID=996.  
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gross private investment dropped almost a trillion dollars to $1,397.2 billion in the 
second quarter of 2009, the bottom of the investment trough, roughly three 
quarters after the failure of Lehman Brothers.  And over the last two quarters, 
private investment has plateaued at around $1.8 billion per annum, as can be 
clearly seen in Graph 2.  Even if we remove residential investment from the data, 
and consider non-residential real private investment, we can still see that private 
investment, while on a steeper upward trajectory, is still well below the pre-
recession levels.  
Furthermore, the labor market in the U.S. has clearly not fully recovered, 
with the number of employed workers in all private industries still falling six 
million below its pre-recession level.48  The employment aspects of both the Chief 
Executive and Business Roundtable CEO Confidence indices remain well below 
the broader index values, evidencing significant uncertainty within the labor 
market.  A measure of evidence contrary to this position was obtained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey49, depicted in 
Graph 3, which surveys manufacturers in the Third Federal Reserve district.  The 
diffusion indices, calculated as the difference in the percentage of manufacturers 
who have reported (present) or expect (future) employment increases and those 
who have reported or expect decreases, show that manufacturers in that sample 
have recovered to a greater extent than those surveyed by other studies.  The 
difference among uncertainties generated within different industries may be an 
interesting area for further research, or perhaps this is capturing a geographical 
trend, but it is in disagreement with other survey data on business executives and 
has been used as the basis for several studies disputing systemic uncertainty.50  
There is also substantive evidence of continuing systemic uncertainty to be 
found in the market for corporate bonds.  According to data obtained from the 
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, the yield rates for 30-, 60-, 
and 90-day maturities of AA-rated non-financial corporate paper have differed 
from each by an average of .87%51 from 1997-2007, with two deviations to about 
a 10% difference between 30- and 90-day maturities in the summer of 2000.  
                                                 
48
 Robert Higgs, “U.S. Economic Recovery Remains Anemic, at Best,” The Beacon Blog, Nov. 6, 
2011, http://blog.independent.org/2011/11/06/u-s-economic-recovery-remains-anemic-at-best.   
49
 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Business Outlook Survey,”www.phil.frb.org, accessed 
Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/business-outlook-
survey/. 
50
 Rudiger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, “Uncertainty Business Cycles - Really?” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16862 (2009); Rudiger Bachmann, Steffen 
Elstner and Eric Sims, “Uncertainty and Economic Activity, Evidence from Business Survey Data, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 16143 (2010). 
51
 The percent difference between non-financial AA-rate corporate paper of 30- and 90- day 
maturities averaged for every month during the years 1997 - 2007. 
11
Kreider: Systemic Uncertainty
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012
During the financial crisis, the percent difference between the yields on 30- and 
90-day commercial paper reached an astounding 74.2%.  Simultaneously, the 
difference between 30- and 60-day maturities also increased to 64.8%.  Since that 
time, the difference between the rates-of-return has failed to return to pre-
recession values, as can be clearly seen in Graph 4.  While the stock market may 
have recovered much of the value it lost during the financial crisis, the steep yield 
curve exhibited by the difference between varied maturities of corporate bonds is 
compelling evidence that investors are uncomfortable with parting from their 
capital over long-periods without a much greater return on their investment. 
The effect of uncertainty is even more pronounced in the market for AA-
rated financial paper, see Graph 5, where the effects of the financial meltdown 
and the ongoing debt crisis in Europe is wreaking havoc on the ability of market 
participants to accurately forecast into the future.  Thus in the financial sector, far 
from dissipating after peaking at a 69.9% difference between 30- and 90-day 
maturities in September 2009 and subsequently declining, the yield gap has been 
steadily trending back upward, reaching 57.14% in November of 2011, the latest 
month for which data is available. 
Turning to the financial data on financial derivative instruments meant to 
transfer or mitigate risk, two of the most obvious instruments to examine are 
interest rate swaps, futures contracts, and options.  Interest rate swaps can be used 
to mitigate risk exposure to interest rate fluctuations, among other functions, and 
thus under conditions of greater systemic uncertainty, the premium put upon long-
term contracts increases relative to their shorter-duration counterparts. While 
much of the data on options and futures is proprietary, the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors data contains the interest premium charged on interest rate swaps 
over the past decade, and as before, there is a clear difference between varying 
contract terms, see Graph 6.  Prior to the financial collapse, interest rate swaps of 
1- and 3-year were nearly on par, separated by only 1 - 6%.  But through 2008, 
the interest rate swap differential has not fallen below 50% until August, 2011.  
With the evidence from the current economic situation before us, let us 
turn our focus towards the smaller recession that the NBER data indicates during 
2001, the first term of President Bush.  The bursting of the so-called “dot com 
bubble,” caused a dramatic stock sell-off of internet companies and a period of 
GDP decline over the course of several months.  As previously seen in Chart 1, 
business confidence reached and maintained high numbers from 2003 until the 
financial collapse discussed in the preceding pages.  Yet President Bush’s first 
year in office was characterized by a stock market collapse, the September 11th 
attacks, and economic recession.  According to the NBER numbers, the recession 
of 2001 lasted only eight months, but the stock market slump continued over 
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almost two-years, with the S&P Index dropping almost half of its value during 
that period.  Private investment continued to slump through much of 2002, 
returning to its former upward trajectory at pre-bubble levels in 2003 - 2004. 
Evidence from polling data surrounding that time supports the general 
assertion that President Bush was generally viewed as a “pro-business” president.  
During his reelection campaign, a Fortune Small Business poll found that 53% of 
entrepreneurs and small-business owners preferred President Bush to challenger 
John Kerry.52  The Duke University Fuqua School of Business and Financial 
Executives International conducted quarterly polls from 1998 - present, and their 
results indicate that though the economy was generally underperforming, large 
percentages of CFOs and CEOs remained confident that an economic rebound 
was imminent.  Even during the height of the 2001 recession, quarter 3, the FEI 
survey found that a full 48% of respondents indicated that they were planning on 
adding to the payroll in the coming quarter, with an average reported percent 
increase of 3.31%.53  
The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon 
shattered what looked like a quick recovery.  The stock market plunged to lower 
levels than seen during the trough of the recession.  Yet in the midst of that, the 
FEI survey found that 88% of CFOs believed that the country’s economic future 
was secure and would rebound by either the first (17%) or second (71%) of 
2002.54  The fourth quarter report of the Fuqua FEI report continued this trend, 
with CFO’s overwhelming responding that employment would come back from 
its highpoint of 5.7% and 53% of respondents answering that their own firms 
would be hiring in 2002.55  While the results of the survey indicate that only 
modest growth was predicted, the main point is that they still generally viewed the 
conditions of the economy positively.  By the first quarter of 2002, 259 out of 260 
surveyed CFOs responded that GDP growth for 2002 would be positive and that 
corporate earnings would be up.56 
It would be theoretically convenient to point to the robust business 
confidence in this period by pointing to the Bush Tax Cuts passed in two parts in 
2001 and 2003.  However, several survey results would undermine this.  In the 
first quarter of 2002, only 1.7% of CFOs in the Fuqua FEI survey identified the 
                                                 
52
 Richard Murphy, “Why Bush Gets a Thumbs-Up on Main Street,” Fortune Small Business, Oct. 
1, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/10/01/8187291/index.htm. 
53
 Duke/CFO Magazine, “Global Business Outlook Survey,” cfosurvey.org, accessed Dec. 12, 
2011, http://www.cfosurvey.org/index.htm. 
54
 Ibid, 2001 Quarter 3 results sheet. 
55
 Ibid, 2001 Quarter 4 results sheet. 
56
 Ibid, 2002 Quarter 1 results sheet. 
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new tax laws as having the greatest effect on their business for the coming year, 
while consumer spending came in at 37.6%.57  However, this result can actually 
be viewed as support for the argument that the level of uncertainty that occurred 
as a result of the political actions taken by George W. Bush was minimal.  Across 
the next three years of survey data, no political factor ever ranked above 5% on 
this particular question as businesses focused on the problems of labor supply, 
technological advancement, and consumer spending patterns.  The silence speaks 
volumes. 
The financial data generally confirms this analysis.  Over the period from 
2001 - 2003, private investment steadily rebounded, even accounting for the 
secondary dip after the attacks on September 11th.  Private investment reversed its 
downward trajectory by the fourth quarter of 2001, and by early 2004 it surpassed 
its pre-2000 level of $2.01 trillion.  Comparing the private investment graphs for 
the 2001 and 2008 recessions, shown in Graph 7, the greatest difference to be 
seen is the duration of the change.  The left-hand graph, though following the 
same basic pattern of the right-hand graph, accomplishes a complete rebound in 
under two years.  The right-hand graph shows only half as much progress over 
almost three years.  This growth is even more impressive when one considers that 
the primary economic causal forces were supplemented by the terrorist attacks on 
9-11, which provided a short-run crisis in the stock market. 
There is an interesting discrepancy to note among the financial data, 
however.  The yield differentials over this time period were consistent with the 
data presented above, with very small differences across the terms to maturity for 
non-financial, and financial, corporate paper, see Graph 8.  In this regard, the 
difference between the returns to various maturities fluctuates for the most part 
between 0 and +/- 5%, with notable exceptions directly preceding national 
elections for president, which Julio and Yook found to be highly predictive of 
cyclical investment behavior.58 But the interest swap rates over President Bush’s 
first year in office manifested a high degree of divergence based upon the length 
of the contract.  The analysis advanced previously would thus conclude that a 
high degree of model uncertainty existed with regard to interest rate fluctuations.  
This seemingly contradictory finding can be explained with an examination of 
President Bush’s monetary policy during his first term.  Under the leadership of 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, President 
Bush expanded the money supply dramatically over the course of his first term. 
Graph 9 tracks the expansion of the money supply, M1, during that time.  Apart 
from the dramatic surge that can be seen in the fall of 2001, President Bush 
                                                 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Julio and Yook, “Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles,” (2010). 
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steadily increased the supply of money supply through aggressive monetary 
policy, in the words of Greenspan himself, “During 2001, in the aftermath of the 
bursting of  the bubble and the acts of  terrorism in September 2001, the federal 
funds rate was lowered 4 ¾ percentage points. Subsequently, another 75 basis 
points were pared, bringing the rate by June 2003  to its current 1 percent, the 
lowest level in 45 years.”59 
Given the inflationary policies being followed to mitigate the negative 
effects of the burst, it should be no surprise that investors were faced with a 
measure of interest rate uncertainty.  It would be interesting to examine whether 
such trends extended to other financial derivative instruments, but for the 
moment, we will content ourselves with the inflationary explanation.  The 
difference between the rates earned on different term to maturity interest swaps 
can be seen below in Graph 10, where we can see that the percent differences 
almost reach the same level of magnitude as in the 2007-2010 case.  
 
Conclusion 
 There are a number of policy lessons that can be learned from the 
differences between the way Presidents Bush and Obama responded to economic 
crises.  Though both administrations pursued similar fiscal and monetary policy, 
to some extent, the commitment to the business community and property rights 
that existed under President Bush, or at least the popular perception of the same, 
his roll-back of regulatory burdens, and his lowering of marginal tax rates across 
the board created an environment in which investors and entrepreneurs felt 
comfortable taking on additional risk.  Evidence of this can be clearly seen in the 
polling data, where the confidence of the business community in the overall 
trajectory of the economy hardly faltered under Bush, despite poor economic 
performance, and in the financial data, where we can see private investment and 
bond yield differentials returning to pre-recession values with relative rapidity.  
Thus the environmental factors necessary to create systemic uncertainty never 
materialized in the period following the implosion of the “dot com bubble” in 
2001. 
 Under President Obama’s administration, on the other hand, the federal 
government has fostered an atmosphere that is not conducive to economic 
recovery.  Passage of the PPACA and Dodd-Frank has only exacerbated the 
uncertainty which already accompanied the generally unfavorable impressions 
with which business leaders viewed his leadership style.  And upon careful 
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 Alan Greenspan, “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy,” The American Economic Review 
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Association (May, 2004): 33-40, 36. 
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reflection, the rhetoric of “fairness,” which has crept into almost every aspect of 
the president’s reelection bid, will only further damage his rapport with the 
business community, providing them with further evidence that his administration 
is strongly contemplating significant revisions to the tax code in the future.  
Between July 22 and October 6, 2011, President Obama held over sixteen events 
in which the theme of his address was tax hikes on topmost-bracket income 
earners.60  Yet so far, he has been unable to put those policies in place, only 
adding to the uncertainty.  If Obama is re-elected, he may well have the 
opportunity to move forward with many of his other policy objectives: stronger 
EPA rules on Carbon emissions and farm dust, eliminating the secret ballot in 
union organization, raising tax rates, and other potential regulatory changes that 
make it impossible for business leaders and investors to accurately forecast future 
market conditions.  The data suggests that rather than risking their capital on the 
whims of an election, investors are shrewdly following their self-interest and 
delaying their plans until the systemic uncertainty has been diminished and a 
clearer picture of future market conditions can be obtained. 
  
                                                 
60
 The Office of the Presidency, “Speeches and Addresses,” whitehouse.gov, accessed October 
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks. 
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Appendix 1: Graphs 
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